Recent research highlights the role of the social context in influencing firms' alliance formation (Gulati and Garguilo, 1999; Gulati and Westphal, 1999; McEvily and Zaheer, 1999; Singh and Mitchell, 1996) . The central findings of this literature include the idea that firms that are highly embedded in a network enjoy advantages in opportunities to form alliances and are more likely to do so (Gulati, 1995) . Highly-embedded firms are those with many existing social ties, such as existing alliances with other firms, that provide them with a central position in a network, while poorly-embedded firms have few connections and exist at the periphery of networks. In addition, invoking the principle of structural homophily, researchers have shown that highly-embedded firms are not only more likely to form alliances, they also are more likely to do so with similar, highly-embedded firms (Chung, Singh and Lee, 2000; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999) . These findings are important to our understanding of how social structure emerges in an interorganizational environment. However, they raise an intriguing question -if highlyembedded firms disproportionately obtain the prerogative to form alliances and these highlyembedded firms tend to link with each other, how does a poorly-embedded firm form alliances or become a more connected part of the network?
The question of how poorly-embedded firms manage to form alliances has important theoretical i mplications (Ahuja, 2000a; Rosenkopf, Metiu and George, 2001) . The alliance formation behavior of such firms provides an opportunity to test for the salience and ubiquity of the homophily principle, and also consider possible alternatives to it. The principle of homophily argues that actors are likely to form ties with similar others. In the context of social structure, this principle suggests that firms are likely to ally with firms in structurally similar positions. This thesis is appealing in the context of some actors. Several arguments suggest that highlyembedded actors will ally with other highly-embedded actors, including the prestige of associating with well-connected actors and the ability to reduce uncertainty by linking with other actors within a dense network. However, the literature has spent less time exploring whether homophily is also attractive for less-embedded actors. Further, to the extent that it is not, what alternative approaches might explain the behavior of poorly-embedded actors?
Assessing alternative approaches will help explain network dynamics. A strict interpretation of the embeddedness dynamic that prior research identifies suggests that interorganizational networks reproduce themselves over time (Gulati and Garguilo, 1999) .
Highly-embedded actors use their prior connections to build new ties and remain deeply embedded in the network, while firms that are not as well connected remain at the periphery of the network. This view suggests a structural application of the Mertonian principle that the rich get richer: network structures are largely stable over time, with embedded firms having their choice of desirable new partnerships and thereby remaining embedded. Nonetheless, empirical reality suggests that most networks do change over time, sometimes quite suddenly and sometimes gradually.
In contrast to the stable conception of networks, other theorists have raised the possibility that networks change because of revolutionary events outside the existing network. Exogenous structure-loosening events create opportunities for new actors and technologies and this leads to an overturning of the established order (Madhavan, Koka and Prescott, 1998) . This alternate view explains changes in network structure in terms of the structure-loosening events and how they facilitate or encourage new partnerships.
However, there remains the possibility of a third path, one that seeks to explain evolutionary change in networks, rather than stable reproduction or revolutionary transformation.
If less-embedded actors could link up with more-embedded actors, they could then use the ties to access other more-embedded actors and slowly become more embedded themselves. This "creeping" strategy of working one's way toward the center of the network would enable change to occur in network structures endogenously, without the need for an exogenous revolutionary disruption. Exploring the theoretical and empirical viability of such a social mobility strategy remains an unaddressed task. This paper attempts to explain alliance formation by poorly-embedded firms, examining the types of ties that weakly-connected firms can form that overcome the constraints inherent in their structural position and thus illustrating how firms' actions can transform social structure.
First, we consider the incentives of highly-embedded firms to promote the social inclusion of poorly-embedded firms and thereby curb the self-reproduction of pre-existing social structures.
Previous studies have emphasized the constraints that poorly-embedded actors face to ally with highly-embedded actors but overlooked the incentives of highly-embedded firms to create asymmetric ties. Second, we analyze whether the structural homophily principle, which guides the formation of alliances between highly-embedded firms, can also extend to the creation of linkages between poorly-embedded partners. Third, we investigate how the social asymmetry that forms the basis of the tie between dissimilar firms affects the terms of trade between them.
Finally, we evaluate how the ties between socially asymmetric allies influence network dynamics. Specifically, we ask whether such ties can serve as launching pads for a focal peripheral firm to form ties with more-embedded actors and so become more central themselves.
THEORY The Downside of Embeddedness
Embeddedness assists interorganizational collaboration by mitigating the uncertainty of alliance formation and by providing prestige (Gulati, Nohria and Zaheer, 2000; McEvily and Zaheer, 1999; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995) . Although some scholars have argued that embeddedness also may have negative consequences (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997) and can hinder the ability of actors to pursue instrumental goals (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999) , previous literature has emphasized the positive consequences of social structure and often overlooked its less attractive implications (Portes, 1998) . Nonetheless, firms may also consider the implications of over-reliance on embeddedness as a criterion in partner selection.
Several arguments suggest that highly-embedded firms face limits to the uncertainty and prestige benefits of linking with other equally-embedded firms. A firm with rich social contacts can use its informational advantages to assess the capabilities and reliability of potential partners without having to rely on the signals potential partners send via their structural positions. Thus, the uncertainty-reducing signals that a highly-embedded potential partner offers may be less meaningful for other highly-embedded firms. Given this, a highly-embedded firm can leverage its superior information to reach out potential partners that are socially distant. Likewise, by being highly-embedded, a firm already enjoys visible reputation, which reduces the marginal reputational value of a new alliance with a firm in an embedded position.
Moreover, a high level of embeddedness may, of itself, be an obstacle. The same social mechanisms that favor a relationship between highly-embedded actors also introduce rigidities and hinder the ability of firms to pursue instrumental goals (Portes, 1998; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999) . Excessive embeddedness can increase interdependence and restrict firms' actions outside the pool of highly-embedded actors (Granovetter, 1973; Podolny, 1994; Uzzi 1997 ).
An additional limitation of embeddedness as a guide in partner choice is that, although it may reduce the uncertainty involved in interorganizational collaboration, it may cause firms to ignore potentially successful alliances, produce systematic biases, and lead to substantially flawed judgments (McEvily, Perrone and Zaheer, 2003) . A search strategy that focuses on the pool of highly-embedded firms may reduce some hazards of interorganizational collaboration.
However, whereas such a search strategy might increase the l ikelihood that partners will be competent and reliable, it does not ensure that the partnerships will be those that have the greatest potential. By opting for safe partnerships, firms may forgo the benefits of collaborating with less-embedded but more valuable partners. Some firms that appear to have little to offer, based on their low levels of embeddedness in the network structure, may indeed possess valuable resources to contribute to a partnership.
Thus, embeddedness initially is conducive to alliance formation but ultimately imposes limits to alliance value. After a threshold level, therefore, it is likely that firms discount the value they place on embeddedness in the choice for collaborators. Thus, we expect moderate levels of combined embeddedness to provide incentives to ally, while high levels create disincentives.
Hypothesis 1:
The combined degree of embeddedness of two firms has a nonmonotonic effect on the likelihood that they will form an alliance: an initial level of combined embeddedness has a positive impact but after a threshold level greater combined embeddedness has a negative impact on the propensity of alliance formation.
Homophily versus Social Asymmetry
Firms at the periphery of a network do not enjoy the informational and reputational benefits accruing to highly-embedded firms. Given those difficulties, the question then becomes how poorly-embedded actors manage to form alliances. One possibility is establishing exchange relations with other actors in similar conditions. Several scholars have proposed that coalitions among poorly-embedded actors help restore balance in the distribution of network resources (Cook, 1977; Emerson, 1972) . By allying with partners with similar levels of embeddedness, poorly-embedded firms can gain access to resources, accumulate experience in interorganizational collaboration and, as a consequence, become more attractive as potential partners of highly-embedded firms.
Despite the seeming plausibility of coalition-building as a social mobility strategy, we argue that this will often be an inferior strategy, for two reasons. First, the same factors that hinder the formation of alliances between firms with asymmetric levels of embeddedness make collaboration between poorly-embedded firms less likely. For instance, concerns about partner unpredictability and uncertainty will be as or more salient between poorly-embedded firms relative to partnering with a highly-embedded firm. Second, one must assess partner choices not just in terms of the obstacles to alliance formation but also in relation to the potential benefits resulting from collaboration. Despite the obstacles that inhibit alliances between a poorlyembedded and a highly-embedded firm, the benefits of such alliances may exceed the benefits of collaborating with poorly-embedded partners.
Firms with low levels of embeddedness have less information that they can use to assess the capabilities and reliability of potential partners. The information paucity will be particularly limiting for assessing potential ties with other poorly-embedded firms. By contrast, information about the capabilities and reliability of highly-embedded firms can reach poorly-embedded actors even in the absence of direct or indirect links between them, due to the higher social visibility of highly-embedded firms. Thus, information availability creates greater incentives for poorly-embedded firms to form alliances with highly-embedded firms.
Poorly-embedded firms face the additional constraint to potential partners that they often possess little to offer, which reduces their attractiveness not only to highly-embedded firms but also to their poorly-embedded counterparts. Highly-embedded firms commonly possess more resources than poorly-embedded firms to contribute to an alliance. Even if we suppose that two potential partners -one rich and the other poor in interorganizational ties -have identical technical resources to contribute to an alliance, a poorly-embedded firm can still benefit more from collaborating with the former because the highly-embedded firm can also provide its partner with reputational advantages and vouch for the reliability of the partner to other firms. Therefore, from the perspective of poorly-embedded firms, associating with highly-embedded firms offers greater benefits than allying with poorly-embedded firms.
A question, of course, is why highly-embedded firms would want to ally with poorlyembedded partners. The straightforward reason is that the partners may offer specific resources that the highly-embedded firm could not obtain from other firms (Mitchell and Singh, 1996) .
Network information flows often tend to be localized, with firms in one neighborhood having somewhat different information flowing through the network relative to firms in another part of the network. Forming an alliance with a poorly embedded firm may give a highly-embedded firm a window into activity in a different part of the network. For instance, Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) suggested that central firms may create alliances with peripheral firms to gain access to a new technology, while Ahuja (2000a) found that chemical firms poor in social capital increase their chances of entering alliances when they possess path-breaking inventions. Thus, a poorlyembedded firm with strong resources may b e able to wait for a partnership with a highlyembedded firm rather than jump into an inferior alliance with a loosely-connected partner.
Combining this with the earlier arguments about the limits of alliances between highlyembedded firms, we suggest that:
Hypothesis 2 : A poorly-embedded firm is more likely to form an alliance with a highlyembedded firm than with a poorly-embedded firm.
Social Asymmetry and Terms of Trade
Another question about the formation of alliances that span asymmetric levels of embeddedness is whether social asymmetry affects the terms of trade that the partners negotiate.
Specifically, we examine the extent to which the difference in the embeddedness of joint venture partners affects the control structure of the alliance. Previous research has discussed the interorganizational hazards involved in joint ventures and the ways in which alliance partners can exercise control to alleviate those hazards (Gehringer and Herbert, 1989; Kogut, 1988) . By holding majority ownership, a firm is more able to influence the activities of the alliance and to adjust its effort on the basis of the observed effort of the partner, which helps the firm protect itself from the hazards inherent in interorganizational collaboration. Majority ownership can also help overcome friction between partners that stems from disagreement as to the best ways to allocate resources or responsibilities within an alliance, even in the absence of opportunistic behavior (Conner and Prahalad, 1996) . As we discussed earlier, firms that are highly embedded in a network structure, despite the incentives to ally with socially distant partners, face higher uncertainty about the future behavior of these allies. Therefore, in alliances involving socially asymmetric partners, the partner that occupies a more embedded position in the network structure has strong incentives to retain control. In turn, the poorly-embedded partner will often be willing to accede control in order to obtain the partnership.
Thus, asymmetry in structural position between two firms also translates into asymmetry in the negotiating power when they form an alliance. Even if two socially asymmetric partners expect the same levels of benefits to be realized within the scope of a particular alliance, the implications of such an alliance are more likely to be farther reaching for the partner that is less embedded in the network structure. Apart from the positive reputational spillovers, collaboration with more prominent actors also represents an avenue for poorly-embedded firms to access the network resources mediated by the partner. As a result, the less embedded firm can enjoy increased insertion into the social structure. Firms that are more deeply embedded have more access to certain resources, such as reputation and access to other prominent actors, which can result in imbalance in an exchange relation with less embedded partners (Cook, 1977; Emerson, 1972) . Moreover, poorly-embedded actors, because they tend to be less attractive as alliance partners (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Podolny, 1994) , have a smaller pool of potential partners to choose from, which implies that they will tend to impose fewer conditions to alliance partners that are richer in interorganizational relationships.
Given the advantages of highly-embedded actors in maintaining exchange relations with other central actors, firms occupying peripheral positions in the social structure will often offer favorable terms of trade to entice central actors into an exchange relation (Gulati, 1998; Stuart, 1998) . This introduces a second-order benefit to embeddedness: highly-embedded firms are not only more likely to form new alliances but also able to secure better terms of trade when partnering with less embedded counterparts.
Hypothesis 3 : A firm is more likely to hold a majority ownership position in a joint venture when it is more embedded than its partner.
Terms of Trade and Network Dynamics
As we discussed above, firms are more likely to accept unfavorable terms of trade when partnering with firms that exhibit higher levels of embeddedness in the social structure. This prompts the question whether accepting such conditions enhances the social mobility of poorlyembedded firms, by facilitating the formation of subsequent alliances. That is, does forming an alliance with one highly-embedded partner foster subsequent acceptance by other highlyembedded partners and thereby provide a strategy for entering more central regions of the network? Whether accepting a minority ownership position in a relationship with a more highlyembedded partner will contribute to the social mobility of a poorly-embedded firm depends on what that behavior signals to potential collaborators about the reliability and the capabilities of the firm accepting such a position. We outline competing logics concerning how potential partners will interpret this signal.
On the one hand, a relationship with the highly-embedded firm may serve as a signal of status and reliability for the poorly-embedded firm. The firm's acceptance by an embedded actor confers legitimacy, signaling that a central firm believes the peripheral firm has strong enough resources to merit forming a partnership. Moreover, the minority positions that poorly-embedded actors hold in existing joint ventures with other actors rich in social capital may leave them in the position of a hostage through which their partners can sanction opportunistic behavior (Kogut, 1988; Gulati and Singh, 1998) . This logic suggests that poorly-embedded firms that accept less favorable terms of trade when allying with highly-embedded firms are more likely to form subsequent alliances with central firms, because their minority positions will limit their ability to act opportunistically.
Hypothesis 4 : The acceptance of a minority ownership position in joint ventures with highlyembedded firms has a positive impact on the likelihood that a poorly-embedded firm will form subsequent alliances with firms that are more deeply embedded in the network structure.
However, hypothesis 4 makes a relatively strong assumption about reliability. For the prediction to hold, reliability would have to transfer across relationships. That is, subsequent partners would have to believe that a minority position in one relationship would inhibit the poorly-embedded f irm from acting opportunistically in any of its relationships. Such transferability of reliability often will not hold, which would lead to no relationship between minority ownership and subsequent alliance formation with highly-embedded firms.
Moreover, t he act of accepting a minority position in a relationship with a more embedded firm might actually inhibit subsequent partners, for two reasons. First, while hypothesis 4 presumes that other firms will read a 'reliability' message in the minority ownership relationship with the more embedded firm, it is possible that the minority stake may signal something quite different. Rather than interpret the willingness to accept a minority position as a signal of reliability, potential partners may interpret the minority position as a sign of weakness.
The stronger the resources that a peripheral firm possesses, the stronger its bargaining position with a potential partner, even a highly-embedded partner. Thus, a peripheral firm that settles for a minority position m ay possess relatively weak resources -strong enough for the central firm to be willing to form a relationship, but not strong enough for the peripheral firm to obtain a parity position in the relationship. The willingness to accept unfavorable terms of trade may lead potential partners to infer that the firm is not an especially attractive partner.
Second, the minority position may limit the firm's future independence, which could deter other partners. The fact that the highly-embedded firm has a majority position may inhibit other firms from allying with the peripheral firm, if they fear that the first partner could use its controlling position to control future activities of the less-embedded firm. Thus, minority acceptance in one partnership may inhibit subsequent acceptance by other firms, rather than encourage new partnerships.
Hypothesis 4alt:
The acceptance of a minority ownership position in joint ventures with highlyembedded firms has a negative impact on the likelihood that a poorly-embedded firm will form subsequent alliances with firms that are more deeply embedded in the network structure.
In summary, the hypotheses focus on factors that will lead highly-embedded and poorlyembedded firms to form alliances. We expect combined embeddedness to h ave a nonmonotonic impact on alliance formation by pairs of firms, first increasing and then decreasing (H1). We expect poorly-embedded firms to prefer heterophilous alliances with central firms rather than homopholic alliances with other peripheral firms (H2). We expect less-embedded partners to be willing to take minority positions in their relationships with more central firms (H3). Finally, we offer alternative arguments concerning whether the minority positions will make peripheral firms attractive to subsequent more-central partners (H4 and H4alt). Together, the arguments help trace conditions under which poorly-embedded firms can overcome constraints to alliance formation and may be able to move toward the center of a network structure. Thus, the arguments have direct implications for an endogenous theory of network evolution.
DATA AND METHODS

Data
To test the hypotheses, we used data on alliance activities of 97 leading firms from the global chemical industry over the period 1983-1991. Interorganizational collaboration is common in the global chemical industry and affects the technological performance of firms in this industry (Ahuja, 2000b) , thus making this industry an appropriate empirical setting for the study.
Given that the goal of this paper is to examine the propensity of alliance formation between any two firms in an industry, the sampling frame included all potential dyads that could have been formed among the participants of that industry during the period of study. Therefore, the definition of the sample starts with identifying the firms participating in the industry.
Because obtaining information on collaborative linkages for smaller firms over an extended period of time is extremely difficult, we selected the leading chemical companies in Western Europe, Japan, and the United States. Previous studies have used a similar strategy of focusing on the leading firms in an industry (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Ahuja, 2000a) . We identified the leading chemical firms based on lists in trade journals such as Chemical Week and C&E News.
We chose companies regardless of whether they had formed an alliance in a given year, to avoid sampling on the dependent variable. From an initial sample of 107 distinct firms, we settled on a final sample of 97 firms after dropping 10 companies that lacked reliable data.
Previous research shows that interorganizational hazards are greater in alliances involving technology (Gulati and Singh, 1998 
Measures
Dependent variables
Alliance Formation -The dependent variable in hypotheses 1, 2, and 4 is the formation of an alliance between two firms in a given year from 1983 to 1991. As we mentioned earlier, the unit of analysis is the dyad; we considered all possible dyads, excluding reverse-ordered pairs. We adjusted the data set to account for mergers and acquisitions that occurred during the study period. Adopting the full risk set to avoid selection bias is consistent with the research strategy in studies of alliances at the dyadic level (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999) . Such a strategy is particularly important in this study, because we want to examine the formation of alliances by firms that are poorly-embedded in the network structure, including firms that have not previously engaged in interorganizational collaboration. For each dyad-year observation, we coded a dichotomous dependent variable indicating whether that pair of firms formed an alliance with a technological component in that given year. We considered all dyadic observations for alliances involving more than two partners.
Majority Ownership -The dependent variable in Hypothesis 3 is the holding of a majority ownership position by a firm in a joint venture. We gathered data on the ownership structure at the time of creation for each joint venture that the firms in the sample formed. We were able to obtain information on the ownership structure of 140 dyads among the 178 joint ventures the firms formed between 1983 and 1991. We were unable to obtain financial data on 12 of these dyads, which reduced our final sample to 128 dyads. We created a dummy variable with value set to one if the firm with the highest level of embeddedness in a dyad held a majority ownership position, i.e., if its share in the equity of the joint venture was greater than 50%. We also defined an alternative measure, calculated as the ratio between the share owned by the partner with highest embeddedness and the share of the partner with lowest embeddedness.
Independent variables
Combined Embeddedness (H1) -We measured the combined embeddedness of two firms in the network as combined centrality. Following Mizruchi (1993) , Podolny (1994) , and Gulati and Gargiulo (1999), we measured the position of each firm in the network using Bonacich's (1987) eigenvector measure of network centrality. This measure results in higher centrality scores for firms that are linked to many firms, which are in turn linked to many other firms. Higher centrality scores correspond to higher levels of embeddedness. In each year, the centrality score of each firm took a value in relation to the most central firm in that year. To measure the combined centrality of each dyad in each year, we computed the geometric mean of the centrality scores of the two members of the dyad (Mizruchi, 1993; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999) .
Based on the longitudinal data on alliance formation, we constructed the industry network for each year, considering the alliance activities of the sample firms in the previous years. We collected data on the alliance activities of the sample firms for the period [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] to construct the centrality measures we used to predict alliance formation in 1983. We constructed adjacency matrices for each year to compute the centrality scores, where the matrices represent the relationships between the 97 firms in the previous four years. We weighted the interorganizational links to account for differences in strength between technical agreements and joint ventures (Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 1991) . To assess the robustness of the results, we constructed alternative network structures, considering nonweighted ties and varying the time-span between the previous three and five years. We computed the centrality scores using UCINET 5 (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman, 1999) .
Dyad Asymmetry (H2) -Following Mizruchi (1992), we used dummy variables to identify dyads involving poorly-embedded firms and dyads between firms with asymmetric levels of embeddedness. To characterize alliances between poorly-embedded firms we created the "Poorly Embedded Dyad" variable, which equaled 1 if both firms in the dyad had centrality scores lower than the mean score in the given year and to 0 otherwise. Similarly, we created the " Socially Asymmetric Dyad" variable to characterize dyads with asymmetric levels of embeddedness. This variable equaled 1 if one of the firms in the dyad had centrality score lower than the mean while the other had centrality score equal or greater than the mean observed in a given year.
Minority Positions (H4) -To examine how a firm's acceptance of minority position in a joint
venture formed with a highly-embedded partner influences its ability to form subsequent alliances with partners that are more deeply embedded in the network structure we identified the minority positions of the less embedded firm in each dyad. We counted the number of joint ventures that the firm with the lowest centrality score in a dyad formed with a highly-embedded partner in which the partner held more than 50% of the equity. Hypotheses 4 and 4alt refer to the effect of those minority positions on the propensity of poorly-embedded firms to form new alliances. For the cases in which the less embedded firm in a dyad was poorly embedded we created the variable "Previous Minority Positions of Poorly-Embedded Firm". To control for the effect of minority positions on the formation of new alliances by highly-embedded firms we created the variable "Previous Minority Positions of Highly-Embedded Firm".
Embeddedness Asymmetry (H3) -We measured the difference in the level of embeddedness between two partners in a joint venture by subtracting the centrality score of the firm with lower centrality from the centrality score of the other firm in the dyad.
Control variables
Year dummies -To control for the possibility that unobserved temporal factors or other unspecified events affected the propensity of firms to create alliances, we added dummy variables for each year between 1984 and 1991 with the default year being 1983.
Previous alliances -Previous studies show that two firms are more likely to ally if they accumulate a history of direct ties (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Chung, Singh and Lee, 2000) . To control for that effect, we created the variable " Previous Alliances", with the number of links that any pair of two firms had formed in the past. We obtained similar results when we considered only alliances formed in the previous three, four, or five years.
Resource similarity -Previous literature shows that resource needs influence alliance formation (Dussauge, Garrette and Mitchell, 2000; Kogut, 1988; Pfeffer and Novak, 1976) . To control for the impact of resources on the propensity of certain dyads to create alliances, we constructed measures of resource similarity in regard to technical, geographic and product-market resources.
To measure the similarity of the technical resources that two firms possessed, we considered the distribution of firms' inventions across 80 technological classes that chemical companies use. Previous studies have used patents as indicators of technological resources (Griliches, 1990; Patel and Pavitt, 1995; Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2001 ). For each firm in the sample, we counted the number of patent applications in each technological class in a given year.
Then, for each firm we computed the proportion of all patents in each technological class. To capture the resource similarity between firms i and j in year t, we created the variable "Technical Similarity". The variable took the value 2 -S k=1,80 (PP ikt -PP jkt ) 2 , where PP ikt (PP jkt ) corresponds to the proportion of patents that firm i (firm j) applied for in technological class k in year t.
To measure geographic resources, we considered the number of subsidiaries that each firm owned in each of 156 countries in each year. For each firm we identified all the subsidiaries it owned in the period between 1982 and 1990 and computed the proportion of subsidiaries in each country. To measure the geographic similarity between firms i and j in year t, we created the variable " Geographic Similarity". The variable took a value equal to 2 -S k=1,156 (PS ikt -PS jkt ) 2 , where PS ikt (PS jkt ) corresponds to the proportion of subsidiaries that firm i (firm j) owns in country k in year t.
We created the variable " Product-market Similarity" to capture the similarity between two firms in terms of the product-markets they are active in, based on the proportion of sales they obtained in each of 120 market segments defined at the level of 4 -digit SIC code. This variable took a value equal to 2 -S k=1,120 (PI ikt -PI jkt ) 2 , where PI ikt (PI jkt ) corresponds to the proportion of sales that firm i (firm j) obtained in market k in year t.
Financial measures -We included several financial controls to control for the possibility that differences between firms in terms of financial performance or financial resources affect their propensity to form an alliance. The control variable for performance subtracted the lesser from the greater value within each dyad, using return on assets to measure performance. For size, liquidity, and debt-equity, we used the ratio of the lesser to the greater value within the dyad.
Size was total assets in chemical industry that each firm possessed. Liquidity was the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. Finally, we included the Debt-Equity ratio to address leverage. Previous work at the dyadic level has used similar ratio measures as control variables (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999) .
Technical resources -Two additional control variables addressed the possibility that differences between two firms in relation to the amount of technical resources they possess have an impact on their propensity to create an alliance. " Chemical Patents" contains the ratio between the chemical patents that each firm possessed in a given year, from the lesser to the greater number. Chemical R&D is a similar ratio, based on the amount that each firm invested in R&D in the chemical industry.
We also used several control variables in the models testing the effect of embeddedness asymmetry on terms of trade (H3). We control for the possibility that similarity between the partners in terms of technical, geographic, product-market and financial resources may affect the propensity of the partner with the highest level of embeddedness in a joint venture to secure a majority ownership position. We control for the effect of previous collaborations on the propensity of more embedded firms to hold a majority ownership position. Finally, we control for the possibility that the number of participants in a joint venture affects the likelihood that a given firm will hold majority ownership. Tables 1 and 2 report descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables we use in the study. The correlations report no particularly strong associations among the independent variables, other than among the arithmetically related variable for combined embeddedness and its squared term.
********** Table 1 and Table 2 about here **********
Model estimation and econometric issues
The dependent variable in hypotheses 1, 2, and 4 denotes whether two firms formed an alliance in a given year (Alliance Formation ijt = 1 or Alliance Formation ijt = 0). We tested these hypotheses using the probit specification, which models the likelihood of alliance formation, i.e., p ijt , where p ijt = Pr (Alliance Formation ijt = 1) and (1-p ijt ) = Pr (Alliance Formation ijt = 0). In the probit model, ? -1 (p ijt ) = X ijt-1 ß + e ijt , where X ijt-1 is a vector of time-varying covariates, ß is a vector of estimated coefficients, e ijt is a normally distributed error term and ? -1 is the inverse of the cumulative normal density function. Because unobserved time-invariant effects that the remaining variables do not capture may influence the propensity of alliance formation, we opted for a random effects panel probit model, which accounts for the presence of such effects (µ ij ).
The model then becomes ? -1 (p ijt ) = X ijt-1 ß + e ijt + µ ij . In sensitivity analyses, we found similar results with a random effects logit specification.
Fixed effects models offer another approach to unobserved heterogeneity. Unlike random effects models, fixed effects specifications do not make the restrictive assumption of zero correlation between unobserved effects and the regressors. However, fixed effects models can be problematic when there are many groups but only a few observations (Chamberlain, 1985) as is the case in the present study, in which there are over 4,500 dyads and at most 9 yearobservations for each. Moreover, Heckman (1981) has shown that estimates resulting from fixed effects models can be biased for panels of length less than ten. Finally, the fixed effects models would drop observations that did not form an alliance in the period of analysis. This would conflict with the design of this research, which avoids sampling on the dependent variable.
To test Hypothesis 3, we used a probit regression model predicting the likelihood that a firm will hold a majority position in a joint venture. In the specification, ?
where p ijt represents the likelihood that firm i , the one with the greatest centrality score in a dyad, will hold a majority ownership position in a joint venture formed with firm j in year t; X ijt-1 is a vector of parameters with independent and control variables; ß is a vector of estimated coefficients and ? -1 is the inverse of the cumulative normal density function. Table 3 presents the results of the random effects panel probit models for hypotheses 1, 2, ********** Table 3 about here **********
RESULTS
The results in Table 3 support Hypothesis 1, showing that combined embeddedness has a curvilinear impact on alliance formation. The coefficient on Combined Embeddedness is positive and statistically significant. This is consistent with previous work showing that alliances are more likely to be formed between firms that are deeply embedded in the network structure (Gulati and Gagiulo, 1999) . Nonetheless, very high levels of embeddedness have a negative impact on the formation of interorganizational ties, as the negative coefficient on Combined Embeddedness Squared shows. These coefficients reveal that combined embeddedness has a positive impact on alliance formation up to a level but, beyond that level, reduces the propensity of two firms to create a tie. The combined embeddedness of two firms has the largest positive impact on alliance formation when it is around 0.6, which lies within the observed data range.
Hence, there is a non-monotonic, inverted U relationship between combined embeddedness and the likelihood of alliance formation.
To test Hypothesis 2 we compare the coefficients on Socially Asymmetric Dyads and
Poorly Embedded Dyads using a Wald Test for difference of coefficients. The hypothesis predicts that the coefficient on the Socially Asymmetric Dyads will be higher than the coefficient on the Poorly Embedded Dyads. As expected, not only is the coefficient on the Socially Asymmetric Dyads substantially greater than the coefficient on the Dummy Poorly Embedded
Dyads but also the difference between these two coefficients is statistically significant. Based on the results of the full model, we can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient on Socially Asymmetric Dyads (0.136) is equal to the coefficient on Poorly Embedded Dyads (0.047) at plevels of 0.06 or better. This comparison supports Hypothesis 2, showing that poorly-embedded firms are more likely to ally with highly-embedded firms than to partner with firms that are also poorly-embedded in the network structure.
Finally, the results in Table 3 support H4alt rather than H4. As Model 4 shows, the coefficient on the variable Previous Minority Positions of Poorly-Embedded Firm is negative and significant. This result reveals that poorly-embedded firms that have accepted unfavorable terms of trade in the form of a minority ownership position in joint ventures with more embedded firms are less likely to form new alliances with firms that are more deeply embedded in the network structure. This finding is consistent with the argument that accepting unfavorable terms of trade signals that poorly-embedded firms have less to offer to potential partners and/or will face constraints on their future activities. The coefficient on the variable Previous Minority Positions of Highly-Embedded Firm is not significant. This indicates that the "Previous Minority
Positions" finding applies only to poorly-embedded firms, i.e. accepting unfavorable terms of trade does not affect the formation of subsequent ties for highly-embedded firms, even though the minority positions do inhibit subsequent relationships by poorly-embedded firms.
Several control variables in Table 3 influence alliance formation. The coefficients on Technical Similarity, Geographic Similarity, and Product-market Similarity are all positive and highly significant, which is consistent with both the argument of absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990 ) and of competitive interdependence (Pfeffer and Novak, 1976) . The positive coefficient on Previous Alliances suggests that the formation of alliances is more likely to occur between partners with previous links. The negative coefficient on Performance Difference indicates that firms with great difference in performance are less likely to form alliances, i.e., the more similar the performance of two firms, the more likely they are to create a tie. Finally, the coefficient on Chemical Patents suggests that firms with similar number of patents have greater propensity to ally. Table 4 reports the tests of Hypothesis 3. As expected, these results indicate that a firm is more likely to hold a majority ownership position in a joint venture when it is significantly more embedded than its partner. The coefficient on Embeddedness Asymmetry is positive and statistically significant at p -levels of 0.05. Thus, the greater the difference in the embeddedness of two firms, the greater the chances that the less-embedded firm will accept a minority ownership position in the joint venture. In sensitivity analysis, we checked that the results are robust to including year dummies in the model as well as to specifying the dependent variable as the ratio between the share of the partner with the high embeddedness and the share of the partner with low embeddedness. Finally, we also ran models without financial controls, so as to use all 140 dyads in the regression, and obtained similar results for Embeddedness Asymmetry.
********** Table 4 about here **********
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Previous research shows that alliances commonly involve firms that are highly embedded in the pre-existing network structure, which prompts the question of whether and how poorlyembedded firms participate in alliances. Our examination of alliance activities of global chemical firms in the period between 1983 and 1991 explores the factors that lead peripheral firms to form alliances. First, the degree of combined embeddedness of two firms has a curvilinear impact on the likelihood that they will form an alliance. Thus, firms that are more embedded in the network structure are initially more likely to form an interorganizational tie. However, as the combined embeddedness of two firms exceeds a threshold level, they become less likely to ally. This finding points to the decreasing marginal benefits of embeddedness as a guide in alliance formation and suggests the existence of incentives for highly-embedded firms to ally with less embedded partners.
Second, poorly-embedded firms are more likely to ally with highly-embedded partners than to create ties with other poorly-embedded firms. This finding suggests that poorlyembedded firms often prefer to wait for partnerships with more central firms, rather than ally with other peripheral firms.
Third, a firm is more likely to secure more favorable terms of trade, in the form of a majority ownership position in joint ventures, when allying with a less embedded partner. Thus, central firms can use their embeddedness as positions of power in negotiating relationship agreements.
Finally, we found that accepting unfavorable terms of trade, which is a strategy that can help a poorly-embedded firm to attract a highly-embedded partner, can hinder subsequent social mobility by reducing the chances of that firm to participate in new alliances. Thus, minority positions may offer initial expansion opportunities but constrain further expansion.
We began the paper with two overarching questions. First, we were interested in understanding how poorly embedded firms form linkages. Second, we wanted to explore how the alliance choices of less embedded firms influence network dynamics. Our findings have implications for both issues.
The first overarching implication is that homophily offers only a partial explanation of partnering choices. While homophily may work well to explain the linkage behavior of embedded firms, there are limits to its strength in predicting the linkage behavior of less embedded firms. This study suggests that at least three factors limit the influence of homophily in explaining the alliance behavior of less embedded firms. First, alliance formation is likely to derive from a calculus of incentives as well as of constraints. Previous research has emphasized the constraints that poorly-embedded firms face when searching for alliance partners but has underemphasized the incentives for creating t ies between allies with asymmetric levels of embeddedness. At the margin, a densely embedded firm may be willing to link with a less embedded partner and thereby avoid over-reliance on embeddedness when choosing allies.
Similarly, while forming a coalition with another poorly-embedded actor is possible (Emerson, 1972) , in practice this strategy will be limited to the extent that such poorly-embedded partners may not be as attractive, in instrumental or social terms, as more densely embedded ones.
Finally, a third reason why the focus on homophily may be overstated is because prior research has not focused directly on the possibility that the terms of trade in an alliance provide a mechanism by which less embedded firms may entice more embedded firms to link with them, thus making heterophilous relationships more likely. This last point also draws attention to a secondary benefit of embeddedness. Embeddedness not only makes a firm more likely to participate in alliances, but also enables it to obtain favorable terms of trade in those relationships.
The second overarching implication concerns network dynamics. The formation of alliances between socially asymmetric partners partially attenuates the self-reproducing character of interorganizational networks. Despite the tendency towards self-reproduction that results from reliance on the structural positions of firms in the pre-existing structure, poorly-embedded firms do manage to form alliances, sometimes by offering highly-embedded partners better terms of trade in relationship governance.
At the same time, the study suggests that there are limits to the utility of governance discounting as a mechanism for social mobility. In particular, the results suggest strong constraints on the ability to undertake a strategy of "creeping toward the center". We find that less-embedded firms frequently are willing to undertake minority positions in order to obtain relationships with more central firms. Such partnerships increase their own centrality. However, the minority positions then inhibit subsequent partnerships and make it difficult to move further toward the center. Thus, the most effective strategy for creeping toward the center is to develop sufficient strength that a highly-embedded firm will be willing to form a parity relationship, which will make it easier for the more peripheral firm to continue to form central relationships.
Clearly, peripheral firms face strong constraints in the ability to develop superior resources.
Hence, the evolution of network structure w ill tend to be quite gradual, rather than dramatic and transformational.
In this paper we focused primarily on the impacts of social asymmetry on alliance formation. The effects of homophily and heterophily on alliance outcomes offer a variety of intriguing questions that merit further investigation. For instance, the compatibility of informational and reputational benefits enjoyed by highly-embedded firms may enable them to form more stable partnerships. On the other hand, it may also occur that alliances between structurally homophilous partners tend to be redundant, which can contribute to reduce the longevity of such ties.
In terms of network dynamics, this study shows that, despite the possibility of peripheral firms to form linkages with central partners by accepting less favorable terms of trade, the network structure tends to evolve rather gradually. However, this does not rule out the possibility of transformation of pre-existing structures by exogenous shocks. An area to be further explored is the relationship between the gradual inclusion of peripheral firms into the network structure and the vulnerability of that structure to disruption by radically new technologies. It is possible that, by diversifying the kinds of social and technological resources they have access to, firms in a network structure whose ties span socially asymmetric partners will be more able to respond to such technological shocks. Whether shortening social distance between the members of a network provides a hedge against exogenous transformational effects needs to be further examined. 
